Franz Brentano's remarks on theodicy presuppose both his ethical and his metaphysical views. But he does not tell us precisely how his ethics and his metaphysics are supposed to relate to one another. Indeed, the two appear to be irreconcilable. So I try to show how Brentano's solution to the problem of evil can disclose to us the relation between his ethics and his metaphysics. First I discuss those of his ethical principles which I take to be relevant to theodicy, (...) namely, that mental activity is indefeasibly good in itself, and that in practical decisions only one choice is good. Then I explain the relevant metaphysical doctrines, concerning the substance-accident relation and the principle of sufficient reason. I then raise the general problem of evil, as well as the specific problem for Brentano. And finally I explicate and defend his theodicy, both in terms of what he clearly states and in terms of what we can infer from his writings on what is good and evil, on what exists, and on the nature of God. (shrink)

Shows how Singer's ethical theories threaten human values in a variety of ways.

The Aristotelian conception of the soul as Brentano understood it is examined, with respect to the nature of the soul and mainly to what Aristotle called the sensitive soul, since this is where the issue of the soul's corporeity becomes important. Secondly the difficulties are discussed which Brentano saw in the Aristotelian semi-materialistic conception concerning the intellectual, as distinct from the sensitive soul from Brentano's reistic point of view which and that it is an immaterial substance. Finally there follows a (...) presentation of what is taken to be Brentano's conception of the soul as it appears from a reistic interpretation of his analyses of the act of sensation and of the subject of sensation in order to shed some light on the reistic ontology that may be taken to underlie Brentanos's psychology. (shrink)

In the past, philosophy, as it was brought to life originally by the ancient Greeks, was based on the audacious premise that the cosmos is intelligible, that human reason can come to understand reality at least in part. In the early to mid-twentieth century, however, philosophy was declared dead on both sides of the analytic-continental divide, so it seems appropriate to ask whether philosophy has a future and, if so, what sort of future this could and should be. In this (...) essay, I first look at the claims of philosophy’s demise and their philosophical milieu, focusing on Martin Heidegger, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Then I suggest a reason for the dire forecast, namely, the aftermath of what has been called the “Second Thirty Years’ War,” and respond to objections that can be raised against this explanation. Finally, I indicate the sort of future that I think we should envision for philosophy. (shrink)

Franz Brentano took exception to the classic statement of the correspondence theory of truth, the thesis: veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus. His reasons for objecting to it, and his proposed revision of the thesis, are interesting considered in themselves as well as for the light they shed on Brentano's view of the relation between the thinker and the world. With regard to the former, it is shown how Brentano analyzes the adaequatio thesis word by word in order to demonstrate (...) what he takes to be its fundamental incoherence. With regard to the latter, it becomes apparent, by contrast with the Thomistic understanding of the adaequatio thesis, that Brentano's revision of it in the direction of a phenomenological theory of truth also involves a revised understanding of the nature of the thinker or knower. (shrink)

Brentano's thoughts on unity of consciousness are of central importance to an understanding of his psychology and of his ontology. By means of a reistic interpretation of his views on unity of consciousness, and in contrast with the Aristotelian approach to unity of consciousness, one begins to see the paradoxically objective and realistic spirit of Brentano's subjectivism in psychology.

This elaborate study of Kant's entire philosophical system is the published form of the author's doctoral dissertation and the first in a proposed series of four works on Kant. The overall plan of the book takes the reader from an explication of the general structure of Kant's system, to its epistemological underpinnings, its transcendental elements, and finally its metaphysical implications. There are seventy pages of appendixes.

The name of Franz Brentano is not yet a household word like that of Plato or Descartes, but readers of this volume may well begin to think it should be. From the informative and compelling introduction by Dale Jacquette to the closing essay by the late Karl Schuhmann, the book provides ample evidence of the importance of this thinker to virtually every area and every school of philosophy today. The evidence is incontrovertible, but perhaps the importance has yet to be (...) felt. A recent PBS production, “The Question of God,” features a cameo appearance by an actor playing Franz Brentano as a teacher of young Sigmund Freud, but so far the celebrity of his students has far outshone that of their teacher. Brentano’s philosophical grandchildren are quite diverse, as is obvious from even a short list of those influenced by his students or by his published works: Russell, Jung, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Derrida. One is left with the impression of both the discovery of a common philosophical wellspring and also the proximity of fertile philosophical fields. Jacquette does not exaggerate when he writes, “Readers … may come to see in Brentano’s descriptive psychology the possibility of a radically new philosophy of mind in thought and action, the metaphysics of socially intentional phenomena, and the expression of meaning in culture, a theory whose revolutionary potential has yet to be realized”. (shrink)

Before now, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the multiple relations between A. Comte’s and J.S. Mill’s positive philosophy and Franz Brentano’s work. The present volume aims to fill this gap and to identify Brentano’s position in the context of the positive philosophy of the 19th century by analyzing the following themes: the concept of positive knowledge; philosophy and empirical, genetic and descriptive psychology as sciences in Brentano, Comte and Mill; the strategies for the rebirth of philosophy in these (...) three authors; the theory of the ascending stages of thought, of their decline, of the intentionality in Comte and Brentano; the reception of Comte’s positivism in Whewell and Mill; induction and phenomenalism in Brentano, Mill and Bain; the problem of the "I" in Hume and Brentano; mathematics as a foundational science in Brentano, Kant and Mill; Brentano’s critique of Mach’s positivism; the concept of positive science in Brentano’s metaphysics and in Husserl’s early phenomenology; the reception of Brentano’s psychology in Twardowski; The Brentano Institute at Oxford. The volume also contains the translation of the most significant writings of Brentano regarding philosophy as science. I. Tănăsescu, Romanian Academy; A. Bejinariu, Romanian Society of Phenomenology; S. Krantz Gabriel, Saint Anselm College; C. Stoenescu, University of Bucharest. (shrink)

Impartialist political philosophy must show how and why the priority of impartial justice can be reconciled with a belief in the permanence of pluralism. Although the argument from epistemological abstinence explains the permanence of pluralism, it cannot explain why justice should have motivational priority. It delivers only, and at most, a modus vivendi defence of toleration. The way to attain a defence that is more than a modus vivendi is to ground political impartialism in moral impartialism.

A genuine inquirer seeks the truth; pseudo-inquirers, to make a case for some proposition determined in advance: the sham reasoner, for some proposition his commitment to which is already evident; the fake reasoner, for some proposition to the truth-value of which he is indifferent, but advancing which he believes will benefit himself. Our preposterous environment, in which "everyone shall produce written research in order to live, and it shall be decreed a knowledge explosion" (Barzun) hinders genuine inquiry, encourages the sham (...) and the fake. It has encouraged the factitious despair of the possibility of honest inquiry articulated in much recent philosophy. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to revise the meaning of politics today in light of the full range of meanings of the ancient Greek word politeia. In Plato’s Republic (Politeia), we see a careful intenveaving of this range of meanings as Socrates’ discusses the means and ends of justice. Socrates elaborates a basic meaning of justice: the well-functioning coordination of peoples’ various skills (technai). Enacting justice in this sense enables people to meet their needs. In addition, Socrates points to (...) a further political aim that justice in this basic sense should serve, one that first qualifies enacting justice to be an end in itself rather than only a technical means to afurther end beyond it. In this essay, I explore especially the importance of this additional aim in relation to the first. (shrink)

This paper examines the potential limitations of professional wisdom alongside those of society more generally with respect to upholding the well-being of vulnerable and marginalized people. It presents the dangers, referring to four well-documented illustrations of professional failure, that services and service systems pose when both professionals and society at large do not demonstrate sufficient measures of positive values and ethics to ensure the protection of vulnerable people within care systems. While it argues that reform of service systems and the (...) repair of such breaches are always possible, even such system reform may fail if it is not ultimately guided by wisdom not only from professionals but society itself. Several recent international examples of this wisdom are noted. It sees such wisdom as being located in the inherited values and social ethics of a society and the power of these to guide human conduct in the face of the profound and ongoing limitations of human nature. (shrink)

When surgeons transplant animal organs into humans, people who did not receive the organs incur risks. These third parties may stand near or far in time or space. No one knows the likelihood, breadth, or nature of the risks in question. The common wisdom among infectious-disease specialists is that in the best of xenotransplant conditions, such third-party risk may be minimized but not eliminated.

This essay focuses on the value of self-doubt in moral inquiry and in moral education. Using John Patrick Shanley’s play, Doubt: A parable, as illustration, it shows how self-doubt initiates and extends moral inquiry, highlights one’s epistemic fallibility and connects the inquirer to the virtue of humility. The essay draws on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce, Hullett, Nussbaum, Thayer-Bacon and Elbow to support the idea that the question ‘Am I wrong?’ is important for moral inquiry and for moral education.

This essay looks at the way in which the end of the world syndrome manifests itself regularly as a form of human consciousness. It makes us alert to the possibility of our own instant expiry, causing us both to introspect, as well as to imagine the future of the species. Digitalization and digitization of trauma permits us to see the normality of death as an every present occurrence. Within this context, words have tremendous power, showing us that at each moment (...) we are being ushered into a space not necessarily of our own making. While it frightens us, yet the choices we have are limited to the class and ethnic locations of our everyday survival. While we live, we dream. Negation does not end ambition, it only proves the ephemerality of individual existence and makes us seek to use time as best as our imagination and survival capabilities allow. Our sadness about corporeality is mitigated by the dream we have of species continuity. (shrink)